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Into Trouble”: Anti-Philosophical




“Explaining Is Where We All Get Into Trouble.” Anti-
Philosophical Philosophies in Richard Ford’s
Bascombe Novels
1 Anti-philosophical philosophies are as old as philosophy itself. From Diogenes and the
Cynics’ acerbic denunciations of thought in favor of action, to the Stoic insistence of
Epictetus  or  Marcus  Aurelius  on  the  primacy  of  individual  resolve  over  abstract
speculation,  the  efforts  of  Western  philosophy  to  oppose  philosophy  have  been  a
recurrent  trope of  its  historical  narratives.  This  opposition is  of  course  necessarily
paradoxical: in order to value action, experience, or “life” itself, in contrast to logos or
nous,  this initial desire must itself be thought, thus entering into a logical antinomy
engendered by its own critique. To quote Samuel Beckett in a famous phrase from The
Unnamable: “The search for the means to put an end to things, an end to speech, is what
enables the discourse to continue” (Beckett, 2009 293).
2 What is not always so easy to determine in anti-philosophical rhetorics, however, is
precisely the definition of “philosophy” which lies behind or within their oppositional
motives and motifs. Is it a specific type of philosophy which is being opposed, in which
the word itself is a metonymy for a particular mode of thinking, or more generally a
particular  world-view? Is  it  rather  philosophy as  a  social,  pedagogical  and political
institution, replete with convictions which are not merely epistemic, but profoundly
ideological and moral in nature, linked to the question of epistemological authority and
its inevitable political powers? 
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3 In  contemporary  American  fiction,  anti-philosophical  positions,  expressed  by  both
narrators and characters, frequently expose deeper tensions between the supposedly
competing  discourses  of  literature  and  philosophy.  Such  tensions  are  particularly
prevalent in Richard Ford’s Frank Bascombe novels, above all the first three books of
the tetralogy: The Sportswriter, Independence Day and The Lay of the Land. Especially in The
Sportswriter, which will be the main focus of this article’s analyses, Frank Bascombe’s
constant opposition to reflection and explanation underlines the paradoxical nature of
the quest to liberate “life” or “existence” from the strictures of language and thought. 
4 “Explaining is where we all get into trouble” (Ford, 1986 223), Frank affirms. Indeed,
Bascombe spends a great deal of time explaining why explanation must be avoided, and
producing pages of interpretable text to prove why life must be not interpreted, but
rather lived.  This paradoxical  position may be compared to Nick Shay’s misological
efforts, in Don DeLillo’s Underworld, to preserve a “wordless shock” (DeLillo, 1997 83)
before the world,  or the cynical  renouncement of  the search for meaning in Philip
Roth’s American Pastoral: “He had learned the worst lesson that life can teach—that it
makes no sense” (Roth, 1997 81). Such explicit protests against the practical usefulness
of self-reflection may initially appear symptomatic of an anti-intellectual impetus. This
is even more salient given that the novels in question often formulate critiques of a
society which views philosophy as a threatening limitation of the free American self. As
challenges  however  against  a  reductive,  rationalizing  and  explicative  logos,  these
novelistic discourses of resistance against the philosophical are highly self-critical, self-
reflexive, and metatextual. They thus represent a solipsistic philosophy, with a history
arguably as long as philosophy itself. Far from proposing the United States as an a-
philosophical or anti-philosophical culture, these discourses—as fictional incarnations
of an ironic Cynic, Stoic, or even Socratic archetype—explore the ways in which modes
of reticence against philosophy, construed at once as an institution, mode of discourse,
and epistemological method, are themselves explicitly philosophical positionings. 
5 Before arriving at  the case study of  Richard Ford,  however,  it  is  first  important  to
recognize  the  peculiarly  “anti-philosophical”  reputation  of  contemporary  American
literary realism more generally.1
 
Realism Against Philosophy? On the Claim to Anti-
Philosophical Immediacy in Realist Modes
6 Throughout  its  various  evolutions,  American  realist  fiction  has  maintained  an
ambiguous relationship with philosophical discourse.  In academic contexts,  but also
within the wider reading public, fiction deemed to be “postmodern” is often coded as
more inherently “philosophical,” in both form and content, than novels identified as
part of a realist heritage. The work of such diverse writers as Thomas Pynchon, Kurt
Vonnegut, William Gaddis, Kathy Acker, Carole Maso or David Foster Wallace are thus
frequently  presented  as  more  coherent  objects  of  philosophical  investigation  than
many of their realist contemporaries and forebears.2
7 A brief survey of recent bibliographies yields, for instance, a range of studies on the
philosophical propensities of metatextual, self-reflexive, frame-breaking fictions. For
Thomas  Pynchon,  we  find,  for  instance,  Martin  Paul  Eve’s Pynchon  and  Philosophy:
Wittgenstein,  Foucault  and  Adorno (2014),  Frank  Palmeri’s  “Other  than  Postmodern?
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Foucault,  Pynchon,  Hybridity,  Ethics”  (2001)  or  David  Robson’s  “Frye,  Derrida,
Pynchon, and the Apocalyptic Space of Postmodern Fiction” (1995) to name just a few.
Similarly,  we may mention a plethora of  articles related to the relationship of  Don
DeLillo’s  fiction  to  Tibetan  Buddhism,  Gnosticism,  or  the  philosophy  of  Martin
Heidegger or Stanley Cavell.3
8 The same does  not  quite  hold  true  for  writers  more  often identified  as  part  of  an
unambiguously realist tradition. Indeed, there is something vaguely more incongruous
about  imagining  a  study  on  Richard  Yates  and  Jacques  Derrida,  John  Cheever  and
Michel  Foucault,  Norman Mailer  and Jean-François  Lyotard:  an apparent  conflict  of
world-views, or at least disjunctive contrast, as though literary realism were somehow
too pragmatic, too engaged in sociohistorical depictions, perhaps too lacking in self-
awareness, to be an appropriate object of philosophical inquiry. 
9 In considering realist fiction as somehow less philosophical, a crucial initial question is
thus what we mean by the latter term. The word “philosophy” seems often meant to
reflect  here  a  fundamental  self-awareness  and  self-reflexivity:  awareness  of  the
textuality of text, which frequently goes hand in hand with an explicit foregrounding of
the constructed artifices of literary process. In practicing a more direct or unequivocal
mode of diegesis, and in respecting more conventional approaches to fictional form,
realist modes, whether intentionally or unintentionally, may seem to implicitly align
themselves  with  anti-philosophical  positions,  wherein  the  supposedly  transparent
presentation of the problematic category of “experience” takes center stage,  rather
than the functioning of a self-aware speaker or sentient logos.
10 This critique frequently takes the form of a valuing of “experience,” and a connected
condemnation of the dangers of over-thinking.4 Inherent in this critique is an age-old
attack against philosophy: namely, the notion that it is, at heart, not itself experiential,
but is tantamount to watching the game from the sidelines, rather than being engaged
on the field of play. A further irony lies in the fact that this vision of philosophy as
being against action, and for a mode of passive or neurasthenically morbid inertia, is
also a frequent attack levelled against literature. For literature to take the side of “lived
experience” over reflection is to claim, again paradoxically, that literature is “closer”—
to life, to the real, to action, to ourselves—than the supposedly increased distance of
philosophical rumination.
11 What  is  evoked  is  the  utopian  premise  of  the  nineteenth-century  realist  novel
according to which, as Auerbach puts it, the writer’s mind would seek to attain “a self-
forgetful absorption in the subjects of reality which transforms them” (Auerbach, 1953
486). Thus ascending the need for mimesis, such absorption promises a non-imitative
realm of pure experience. In a paradox similar to that which Derrida outlines (Derrida,
1981  204-207),  literary  realism  in  this  way  simultaneously  stakes  claims  to  truth
because of its accurate mimetic reproduction of the real (an initial sense of mimesis as
imitation), but also because of its power for world-creating absorption (a second sense
of mimesis as the autarchic unfolding of physis). Whereas for experimental modernist
and  postmodernist  fictions  the  questioning  of  mimetic  models  of  art  is  often
specifically foregrounded by fractious formal processes—collage, temporal disjunction,
polyvocality and intertextuality—these processes are often intentionally absent from
realist modes, for reasons which go beyond questions of mere receptive accessibility. As
we shall see, such dissimulation does not mean, however, that complex philosophical
processes are not, in reality, there. 
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Is Philosophy “What Happens”? Dichotomies Between
Experience and Reflection
12 In  seeking,  albeit  problematically,  to  “liberate”  the  subject  from  the  strictures  of
abstract,  formalized,  or institutionalized thought,  many narrators and characters of
American realist works frequently propose an ambiguous vision of philosophical truth
—or, as Frank Bascombe, the hero (or anti-hero) of Richard Ford’s novels, puts it: “The
only truth that can never be a lie, let me tell you, is life itself—the thing that happens”
(Ford, 1986 374). This type of formulation posits the existence of an experiential reality
—“life”—whose truth content is not open to debate, for its very axiology is based on its
mere ontology, on the simple fact that it is “there”—that it exists. The valuing of “the
thing  that  happens”  over  and  above  what  we  may  think  about  it  is  an  explicit
opposition to the sort of self-awareness of being represented by Martin Heidegger’s
Dasein—indeed, it is exactly what Heidegger seeks to prevent, namely an abandoning of
oneself to external events in the idea that, such is the self’s terrible contingency, only
they are endowed with reality and truth. The rather more humble goal becomes, as
Frank puts it, to “maintain a supportable existence that resembles actual life” (Ford,
2006 432). That resembles actual life, but which is not life itself—life being here a purely
hypothetical, speculative concept remaining beyond the scope of subjective resolution. 
13 Bascombe’s  explicit  valuing  of  experience  over  reflection  is  a  startlingly  recurrent
motif  in  modern  American  realist  modes.  Indeed  there  is  an  entire  lineage  of
experiential,  seize-the-day,  notably  male  affirmations  of  lived  intensity  against
philosophical passivity, which extends through F. Scott Fitzgerald, Ernest Hemingway,
Norman Mailer, and culminates perhaps in Jack Kerouac’s all-in-uppercase: “I DON’T
KNOW,  I  DON’T  CARE,  AND  IT  DOESN’T  MAKE  ANY  DIFFERENCE,”  which  Kerouac
himself  presented  as  his  “final  philosophical  statement”  (Kerouac  in  Ross,  1958).
Highlighting its libertarian social aspect, Fitzgerald provides a representative mode of
this anti-reflexive position in a variety of characters. As we read regarding Rosalind for
instance in This Side of Paradise: “Her philosophy is carpe diem for herself and laissez
faire for others” (Fitzgerald, 1920 152). At the heart of this position is a particular mode
of American liberalism: the problem that freedom itself,  rather than a political and
experiential value, may appear as the errancy between values, in an axiological no-
man’s-land, and a fundamental crisis of the value of freedom in a free democratic state.
5
14 Ford’s The Sportswriter provides us with a particularly flagrant and complex example of
the  valuing  of  experiential  immediacy  coded  and  interpreted  as  anti-philosophical
impulse. Nearing forty, the sportswriter Frank Bascombe lives in a state of generalized
affective reverie and uprootedness after the death several years earlier of his youngest
son, nine-year-old Ralph. In the wake of Ralph’s death, Frank multiplied various affairs,
leading to the breakup of his marriage to his wife, referred to in the novel only as “X.”
Now  divorced,  Frank  will  later  embark,  in  the  second  novel  of  Ford’s  series,
Independence Day,  on an era he refers to as “the Existence period”: a time of simple
continuation, an anti-climactic moving through life,  or what he calls “the part that
comes after the big struggle which led to the big blow-up” (Ford, 1995 94). This period
is one of post: post-event, post-action, but also post-reflection and post-understanding.
In stark contrast to the previous generation’s heroic narratives of tragic intensity in
“Explaining Is Where We All Get Into Trouble”: Anti-Philosophical Philosophie...
Transatlantica, 1 | 2020
4
Fitzgerald or Hemingway, Ford’s narrator is divested of the invigorating energies of
action,  yet  is  unsure—as  are  we  as  readers—whether  this  detachment  is  a  form of
psychological and subjective protection, or a state of higher spiritual acceptance.
15 The two possibilities are not, of course, mutually exclusive, for Frank seems to live in a
state which is equal parts distraction and acknowledgment, unfeeling dissociation and
composed abandonment—a state which is hard to determine if it is merely depression,
social dislocation and nihilism, or a wise shedding of futile ego to life’s contingencies:
“in that very way,” as Frank puts it, “our life gets over before we know it. We miss it.
And like the poet said: ‘The ways we miss our lives are life’” (Ford, 1995 5). “The way we
miss our lives are life” for the reason that the category of life itself is only determined
within the continuous state of it being lived. If we cannot view it abstractly, from the
outside, as though we were somehow external agents to its endless becoming, then why
even aim at a rational cognizance which must, by definition, be illusory?
16 Revealingly, the word “philosophy” itself in Ford’s novels most often refers not to an
abstract discipline, but to a practical modus operandi of “how to live”: “Her philosophy
is: A good day’s a good day. We get a few enough of them in a lifetime. Go and enjoy it”
(Ford, 1986 98). Frank is always apparently on the verge of some greater revelation, a
type of higher understanding, which appropriately never comes. In such a worldview,
the values promoted are those of simplicity, immediacy, action and experience, which
against mental speculation or abstraction pose an uncomplicated desire for existence,
pared of overt ratiocinations. This rejection of abstract reflection often gives rise to a
discourse closer to the practical modus operandi of self-help texts than the established
traditions of philosophy, or as Frank puts it: “Best just to swallow back your tear, get
accustomed to the minor sentimentals and shove off to whatever’s next, not whatever
was” (Ford, 1995 152).
17 This refusal of interpretation is in accordance with Frank’s general feeling of depletion 
as life progresses: of the steady loss of intensity which comes from the constant effort
to process experience and attempt to understand it. For Frank, this effort leaves one
increasingly  anesthetized  against  the  very  experience  which  initially  commanded
understanding itself. A feedback-loop of de-intensification is thus created, spreading to
an American modernity affected by the condition, or at least the feeling, of being “too
late”: too late for thinking, too late for planning, too late even for the digestion of the
past. As Frank puts it:
(It’s not exactly as if I didn’t exist, but that I don’t exist as much.) So, if I didn’t
appear tomorrow to get my son […] as little as possible would be made of it by all
concerned, partly in order that everybody retain as much of their own personal
freedom and flexibility as possible, and partly because I just wouldn’t be noticed
that much per se. (This reflects my own wishes, of course—the unhurried nature of
my single life in the grip of the Existence Period—though it may also imply that
laissez-faire is not precisely the same as independence.) (Ford, 1995 176-177)
If one no longer desires, then the apparent cutting of ties is not true independence.
This state comes with a paradoxical feeling of freedom: it is not the positive feeling of
American personal liberty, but the ambivalent independence which comes from one’s
fundamental detachment from the world.
18 Such disengagement is buttressed by what Lene M. Johannessen calls “a narrative mode
of  hazy  monotony  and  semi-apathy” (Johannessen,  2011  80)  which,  perpetuating  a
mask of neutrality and non-ideology, means that “the reader, as well as the narrator, is
far too immersed in the monotonous and levelled narrative to be able to conceptualize
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this choice as an ideational position, a deliberate act on the part of the protagonist”
(Johannessen, 2011 92).  Frank’s rejection of the processes of thought is  importantly
based on the conviction of self-reflection’s practical uselessness, and the impossibility
for it to even influence the world, let alone fundamentally change it.6 As we read in The
Sportswriter:
So much of life can’t be foreseen. A hundred private explanations and exculpations
come rushing up into my throat […]. Though, of course, there is nothing to say. Like
all needless excuses, the unraveling is not worth the time. However, I feel a swirling
dreaminess,  an old familiar  bemusement,  suddenly rise  into my appreciation of
everything around me. Irony is returned. I have a feeling that if I tried to speak
now, my mouth would move, but no sound would occur. And it would scare us both
to death.  Why,  in God’s  name,  isn’t  it  possible  to  let  ignorance stay ignorance?
(Ford, 1986 135)
Frank’s “swirling dreaminess” is a type of suspension and distancing away from both
time and rational processes. The irony of the passage is that, in order to present us this
impossibility of speech, Frank must use the “words without sound” that is  fictional
prose. We see him literally speak his impossibility of speech, in a metatextual doubling
in no way foregrounded by the otherwise formally “transparent” realist prose.
19 It is not just because realist novels, in their language and structure, may apparently
seek  to  hide  internal  paradoxes  that  such  paradoxes  are  not  there.  Moreover,  the
associations of “explanations” with “exculpations” underlines the degree to which such
explanations for Frank may never be a neutral process, but rather a way for the self to
forgive  itself  its  own  errors  by  inventing  a  range  of  sophisticated,  but  ultimately
illusory  reasonings.  These  “explanations  and  exculpations”  are  crucially  “private”:
because  of  their  intimate  locus  within  the  self’s  speaking  throat,  they  cannot  be
extrapolated into a general epistemology or world-view. 
 
Thinking Against Thought: at the Heart of the Anti-
Philosophical Paradox
20 This impossibility of generalizing abstraction is not, however, for the reason we might
expect. Frank refuses this type of generalization not because of his awareness of the
inescapable singularity of his own life—the awareness that not all lives are the same,
and that there are thus no general rules of existence at which we may arrive via a
process of induction, moving from the particular to the general. As the first sentence of
the above passage makes plain, he is in fact never shy about making generalizations
about “life” in general. What rather seems to cancel the value of such reasoning speech
is the recognition that it will not radically change the course of lived events. “What
happens” is somehow seen to be outside of philosophy, rather than integrated into its
workings. What good then is the inventing of such reasonings if what occurs in the
future will only undo the formal systems invented on the basis of past lived events? 
21 “So much of  life  can’t  be  foreseen,”  Frank affirms,  and because  both thinking and
feeling hardly help in foreseeing the future, reflecting on thinking and feeling creates
merely  a  range  of  “needless  excuses,”  which  does  not  alter  experience  in  any
meaningful way. Reflection, conceived here as merely imitative of a prior experiential
original, does not stop bad things from happening, does not stop injustice, and does not
stop pain. What then, Frank asks, can be its fundamental use? The axiological problem
is  of  the  self’s  active  power  to  sculpt  the  world,  or  not,  by  way  of  its  own  inner
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representations. If for Frank “the unraveling is not worth the time,” it is because at the
end  of  such  unraveling—filtering  the  world  down  through  its  inner  subjective
representations—the outer world will have again altered, contexts too will have shifted,
infirming all prior reflections and making all induction a mode of soothsaying: at best
purely speculative, at worst meaningless. 
22 Frank  Bascombe’s  ideal  of  lived  existence—the  individual  who  most  incarnates  the
“being-present” and pure absorption of what he calls “literalness”—is thus ironically,
for such realist fiction, a highly anti-mimetic model, namely: the athlete. For Frank, the
athlete is gifted with “a rare selfishness that means he isn’t looking around the sides of
his emotions to wonder about alternatives for what he’s saying or thinking about. In
fact, athletes at the height of their powers make literalness into a mystery all its own
simply  by  becoming  absorbed  in  what  they’re  doing”  (Ford,  1986  63).  Like  the
adolescent Swede before his downfall in Roth’s American Pastoral, or tennis players in
Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest (1996), the athlete becomes for Bascombe an incarnation of
a  modern,  arguably  highly  American  ideal:  the  individual  who,  though  he  has  not
forsaken feeling,  has  fully  mastered the  ability  to  transfer  emotional  agitation and
turmoil  into  original  action,  even  if  this  action  itself  may  appear,  to  an  outside
observer, solipsistic or vain. Indeed, it is the athlete’s pure absorption that provides a
possible solution to the specific suffering produced by Frank’s distanced removal from
the  real.  Importantly,  we  discover  that  this  absorptive  capacity  requires  a  certain
egotism, and an ability to neglect others who are not so able to reach such an unstable
equilibrium. Nevertheless, it is for Frank the surest way to avoid the endless imitative
mirroring that both over-thinking and over-feeling for him necessarily imply. As he
puts it after a discussion with his girlfriend Vicki: 
An athlete, for example, would never let a story like the one Vicki just told me get
to him, even though the same feelings might strike him in the heart. He is trained
not to let it bother him too much or, if it bothers him more than he can stand, to go
outside and hit five hundred balls off the practice tee or run till he drops, or bash
himself head-on into a piece of complicated machinery. I admire that quality more
than almost any other I can think of. He knows what makes him happy, what makes
him mad, and what to do about each. In this way he is a true adult. (Though for
that, it’s all but impossible for him to be your friend.) (Ford, 1986 63-64)
23 As an antithesis to Frank’s character, but one to which he nevertheless aspires, the
athlete  is  an  image  of  mastered  unicity.  His  or  her  affective,  anti-philosophical
unification,  however  illusory,  is  won  only  after  recurrent  battles  to  preserve  the
fortress of comprehensible, identifiable, unified feelings, which from the outside may
resemble absolute detachment. Again, however, the self-reflexive and imitative quality
of Frank’s reflection is clear: he respects in athletes the capacity for action which he
not only lacks, but discourses at length about, in a cutting irony underlined by the final
verb: “I admire that quality more than almost any other I can think of.” Frank makes us
witnesses  again  to  a  verbose  attack  against  verbosity,  a  passionate  attack  against
passion,  a  thoughtful  attack  against  thought.  In  doing  so,  he  esteems  original
experiential action in an imitative manner, devoid of the very immediacy that it sets
out to praise. 
24 Regarding questions, then, of Frank’s thoughtful opposition to thinking, it is not just
that, as realist narrator, he finds himself in an antinomical position of which he seems
unaware, but that his narrative reinforces the very position it  is  arguing against.  A
certain tradition of realist mimesis is ironically undone, for if actions cannot be directly
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imitated,  and  are  instead  replaced  by  the  representations  which  are  feelings  and
thoughts, a problem arises if such feelings and thoughts are made themselves to argue
that action is indeed superior! In other words, how is literature able to imitate the
supposedly “immediate” action of the athlete if literature itself—as soon as it sets about
representing, narrating, and describing such action—necessarily transforms it into the
less  “immediate”  material  of  a  subsidiary  imitant?  Frank’s  admiration  is  projected
precisely onto what he perceives as both less “emotional” and more difficult to capture
in  literary  form.  Literature  may  well  be  able  to  capture  the  tergiversations  of  the
undecided mind, but the pure state of presence represented by athletic “being-in-the-
world” proves a more challenging task.
25 Frank’s praising of the athlete’s unfazed magnanimity is thus curious on several levels.
Firstly,  it  confuses  the  athlete’s  way  of  dealing  with  emotional  disturbances—the
resorting to repetitive physical mechanisms of relief—as proof of an epistemological
insight. In truth, and in spite of what Frank imagines, the athlete may have no idea
“what  makes  him  happy,”  only  that  he  is happy.  “Happy”  and  “mad”  are  purely
hypothetical,  categorical  affective essences which,  while  meant  to  be originary and
pure,  are  also,  in  spite  of  Frank’s  mythologizing,  inevitably  involved  in  imitative
procedures. “He knows what makes him happy, what makes him mad, and what to do
about each” is a strange conclusion to draw from a situation in which we witness not
the  athlete’s  deep ability  to  understand her  own existence,  but  rather  her  specific
recourses to artificial stopgaps for dealing with affective disruptions. Such techniques
may  be  put  in  place  not  in  order  to  produce  self-understanding  or  philosophical
awareness, but merely to restore a semblance of superficial stability to the bewildered
self. 
26 This absence of depth in emotional engagement hardly makes such an athlete “a true
adult,” in a non sequitur conclusion in which Frank implies that being an adult is defined
by  knowing  the  origin  of  one’s  emotions  in  order  to  dispel them:  to  cathartically
expurgate  them  from  the  body,  restoring  corporality  to  a  balanced,  primordial
homeostasis. Being an “adult,” we may argue, may rather precisely lie in the extent to
which one recognizes that any disturbances coded as negative are not simply to be
banished  by  the  repetition  of  mechanistic  exertions.  Thought  or  emotionality  in
general,  moreover, are perhaps better understood as dynamic interactions in which
one can never entirely know what “makes” one “happy” or “mad,” and “what to do
about each.” For Frank, a “true adult” is made of true feelings, because they are feelings
of  which he  has  recognized the  elemental  origins,  and which he  has  then actively
expelled. Rather than emotional maturity, this ideation rather represents an immature
desire for resolution, via expurgation, of affective derangement, in order to create a
doubtful calm. “It’s all but impossible,” Frank concludes, for such an idealized athlete
“to be your friend”: incarnating only powerfully original affects, and able to ascend
above feeling’s imitative processes, such an “adult” becomes an utterly isolated subject,
unable to interact with other beings traversed by an array of unsettling affective force. 
 
The Psychological Comforts of “Pure Experience”
27 Frank’s  anti-philosophical  positions,  supported  by  his  reliance  on  notions  of  pure
experience, in this way often appear as psychological mechanisms of comfort for the
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disturbed modern self.  As  he himself  puts  it  in  a  typical  moment of  apparent  self-
reflexive sincerity:
I  even  had,  in  fact,  a  number  of  different  voices,  a  voice  that  wanted  to  be
persuasive, to promote good effects, to express love and be sincere, and make other
people happy—even if what I was saying was a total lie and as distant from the truth
as Athens is from Rome. It was a voice that totally lacked commitment, though it
may well  be this  is  as  close as  you can ever come to yourself,  your own voice,
especially with someone you love: mutual agreement with no significant irony. This
is what people mean when they say that so-and-so is “distanced from his feelings.”
Only it’s my belief that when you reach adulthood that distance has to close until
you no longer see those choices, but simply do what you do and feel what you feel.
(Ford, 1986 64)
This passage begins with the recognition of a multiplicity of voices within the self, only
to conclude with the reduction of this multiplicity to the singular “your own voice,”
which is in the end postulated as a singular ideal. Framed as an unattainable unicity,
such unified subjectivity is defined by its positive intentions rather than by the truth of
what it  says. “Though it may well be” and “as Athens is from Rome” are moreover
typical  of  Frank’s  sagacious  Socratic  tonalities;  and  in  spite  of  his  pseudo-Stoical
definitions of emotional compromise, a definition of love as “mutual agreement with
no significant irony” (Ford, 1986 64) shows how radical his distanced rationalizations
have become.
28 “Do what you do and feel what you feel” becomes the deterministic rule of a life that
has come to be lived in supposed immediacy and transparency, but which is in reality
like the closing of all other emotional and intellectual perspectives. “You can never
successfully  argue the case for  your own passions” (Ford,  1986 224),  Frank affirms,
further implying that “passions” are above and beyond not only language, discourse,
and a rational logos, but the epistemological searchings of the self.7 
29 Throughout these reasonings against reasoning, the trope of distance is key, though
Frank is always arguing that he is not in fact adopting a transcendently naturalizing
position, but simply living in the “here and now”:
All this seems odd now, and far away, as if it had happened to someone else and I
had only read about it. But that was my life then, and it is my life now, and I am in
relatively good spirits about it. If there’s another thing that sportswriting teaches
you, it is that there are no transcendent themes in life. In all cases things are here
and they’re over, and that has to be enough. The other view is a lie of literature and
the liberal arts, which is why I did not succeed as a teacher, and another reason I
put my novel away in the drawer and have not taken it out. (Ford, 1986 16)
30 The fundamental irony is that if Frank fully and fundamentally believed that all the
rest was indeed “a lie of literature,” then the very text we are reading would have no
inherent reason for being. The Sportswriter’s very existence argues against the nominal
content that it itself expresses, namely: the value of simply recognizing that “things are
here and they’re over,” and that we must search for no “transcendent themes.” In a
representational context in which literature, like philosophy, constantly argues against
itself, the mimetic paradoxes never cease to spiral and multiply, for to postulate that
there are no transcendent themes to life is, of course, itself a transcendent idea. Or as
Frank goes on, in an extrapolation which may have disturbing ethical implications: 
So I learned this all those years ago—that you don’t need to be held responsible for
what you think, and that by and large you don’t have any business knowing what
other people think. Full disclosure never does anybody any favors, and in any event
there are few enough people in the world who are sufficiently within themselves to
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make such disclosure pretty unreliable right from the start. All added to the fact
that this constitutes intrusion where you least need to be intruded upon, and where
telling can actually do harm to everyone involved. (Ford, 1986 77)
31 Being “held responsible for what you think” is not advisable because of Frank’s valuing
of action, where thought, like feeling, is abstracted: at a remove from the point where
judgment may occur with regard to actions and events in the world. Again, however—
and in spite of his claim to acquired wisdom in phrases such as “I learned this all those
years ago”—if what Frank and others think truly had no value, there would be no point
in us reading the very passage in which he expounds that we do not need to read it. 
 
Against the Immediacy of Feeling and the Moral Risks
of the Anti-Philosophical Imperative
32 Representing thought’s rebellion against thought instigates a mimetic hall of mirrors.
In spite of his constant insistence that life must not be reproduced but rather lived,
Frank constantly displays and foregrounds his own efforts to describe and reproduce,
often in extremely close detail, his own intellectual and emotional processes. Even a
moment  of  disturbance  with  his  girlfriend  is  analyzed  in  an  effort  to  capture  the
indefinable tenor of an affective state:
What I feel, in truth, as I swing these two suitcases off the wet concrete and our
blue bus sighs and rumbles from the curbside toward its other routed hotels, and
bellboys lurk behind thick glass  intent  on selling us  assistance,  is,  in  a  word:  a
disturbance.  As  though I  were relinquishing something venerable  but  in need of
relinquishing. I feel a quickening in my pulse. I feel a strong sense of lurking evil
(the modern experience of pleasure coupled with the certainty that it will end). I
feel  a  conviction that  I  have  no ethics  at  all  and little  consistency.  I  sense  the
possibility of terrible regret in the brash air. I feel the need suddenly to confide
(though not  in  Vicki  or  anyone else  I  know).  I  feel  as  literal  as  I’ve  ever  felt—
stranded, uncomplicated as an immigrant. All these I feel at once. And I feel the
urge—which I suppress—to cry, the way a man would, for these same reasons, and
more. (Ford, 1986 119-120)
“What I feel, in truth” is a phrase which seeks to convince us of the sincerity of its
expression, to persist in Frank’s “uncomplicated” being, even though what follows is as
complicated a  portrait  of  affective  forces  as  we may imagine.  The anaphora of  the
indicative  present  “I  feel”  at  first  seems  to  support  Frank’s  valuing  of  feeling’s
immediacy, but in reality, the need to incessantly repeat “I feel” in order to describe
one’s  immediate feeling demonstrates how processed this  feeling is,  not only by the
thought  that  subsequently  reconstructs  it,  but  by  the  language—replete  with  its
grammatical  strictures—which  will  give  it  formalized  life.  Not  content  merely  to
categorize this experience as a “disturbance” and leave it at that—as may be, one could
argue,  the approach of  the true “literalist”—Frank seeks to dissect  and decode this
disturbance  into  its  contiguous  parts.  These  deconstructed  sensations  range  from
fluctuations  in  bodily  intensities—“I  feel  a  quickening  in  my  pulse”—to  the  less
rationally measurable “sense of lurking evil” or “the possibility of terrible regret.” In
this maelstrom of affects and percepts, what is surprising is less Frank’s catalogue of
contrasting senses, feelings, and intuitions, than the conviction that this maelstrom
may still qualify as living like a “literalist.” And we begin to wonder then, going by
Frank’s  suppression  of  feeling  at  the  passage’s  end,  if  his  theory  of  the  literalist’s
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existence of simple acceptance is not merely a mode of affective repression by a more
sophisticated name.
33 Towards the beginning of The Sportswriter, Frank affirms: “That is the truth of what I
feel and think. To expect anything less or different is idiotic” (Ford, 1986 120). At the
same time as this argument is put forward, the novel’s complex diegesis, replete with
Frank’s self-canceling rhetorics, shows that to affirm “that is the truth of what I feel
and  think”  is  by  definition  never  as  absolute  as  it  may  seem.  And  indeed,  the
categorical  nature  of  these  positions  becomes  apparent  when  Frank  further
extrapolates them into diagnostic labels, creating a dualistic division of humanity into
what he calls “literalists” and “factualists”: 
Another way of describing this is that it’s the difference between being a literalist
and a factualist. A literalist is a man who will enjoy an afternoon watching people
while stranded in an airport in Chicago, while a factualist can’t stop wondering why
his plane was late out of Salt Lake, and gauging whether they’ll still serve dinner or
just a snack. (Ford, 1986 133)
34 There is perhaps nothing wrong with desiring a more immediate mode of apprehension
of experience, where one may partake of the interest of people-watching elevated to
the  status  of  spiritual  activity.  The  problem  lies  in  associating  this  state  with  an
existential immediacy, rather than one which, in its own way, is as constructed as its
apparent opposite. Revealingly, Frank is reticent to admit that this state of “literalism”
is as artificial, in the non-pejorative sense of the term, as always “looking around” what
one feels. Both are philosophically conditioned by an apparatus of desires, contexts,
and  circumstance.  And  as  so  often  in  such  cases,  the  problem  is  related  to  a
fundamental essentialism: for are we not all literalists and factualists depending on the
situation, indeed on the very moment at which we experience a passing affective force?
Are we not, moreover, most often both literalists and factualists at once, within the
selfsame moment, engaged in competing emotional and intellectual dialectics in which
intersect the contrasting aspects of a polyvocal self? 
35 Literalist and factualist, like anti-philosophical or philosophical, describe here not vital
alternating  responses  to  a  fundamentally  dynamic  experience,  but  rather  fixed
subjective categories. In Frank’s vision, it is as though becoming a literalist were to
attain a  higher state  of  being paramount to  spiritual  enlightenment,  distinguishing
such  elected  individuals  from  those  who  still  attempt  to  “look  around”  their  own
feelings, rather than “simply” and “immediately” existing within them. Frank’s vision
of love,  which in the end becomes another emotional  category,  is  reflective of  this
essentialist position: “And finally, when I say to Vicki Arcenault, ‘I love you,’ I’m not
saying anything but the obvious. Who cares if  I  don’t love her forever? Or she me?
Nothing persists. I love her now, and I’m not deluding myself or her. What else does
truth have to hold?” (Ford 1986, 133)
36 We may realize here, however, the ultimate cynical potential of Frank’s dangerous anti-
philosophy  of  experiential  immediacy.  For  in  such  pragmatic  rhetoric,  truth  is
presented as a momentary quality, re-evaluated at every instant. Though we may be
tempted to approve of this vision as somehow anti-essentialistic, Frank’s conclusion is
curious: because of its transitory nature, no future promise of emotional stability is
possible or indeed desirable, a position which thereby delivers the self from all need to
project into the persistence of its affective future. 
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37 What is presented as an enlightened conviction of the mutability of feeling and the
transitory  nature  of  the  self’s  desires  is  perhaps  better  viewed as  a  shirking of  all
deeper emotional engagement. In demanding that the phrase “I love you” refer only to
the instant of its enunciation—and is thus in no way a promise that this emotion will
endure over time—Frank effectively strips love of the future projection that, for Vicki,
intuitively  defines  the  concept.  The  fact  that  love  may  change  with  each  passing
moment in no way means that it is pure immediacy without projection: in this specious
reasoning, Frank produces the ideal moral philosophy to justify the behavior of the
modern narcissist. How can you criticize me, in other words, if I behave badly towards
you in the future, when I have already warned you that all my actions were merely the
temporarily  valid  effects  of  an  immediate,  purely  experiential,  passing  force?  The
advantages then, as Frank describes them, of a possible life together with Vicki would
be: “I could forget about being in my emotions and not be bothered by such things” 
(Ford, 1986 140). In other words, not being “in” his emotions is also not to be bothered
by the difficult communication required in the interpersonal negociations of affective
and intellectual exchange. 
 
Conclusion: “Life” as Philosophical Invention
38 Are  such  apparently  anti-philosophical  currents  in  American  realism  solipsistically
valuable, creating, like Epimenides’s famous liar paradox, a self-generating feedback-
loop  which  cancels  out  their  own  negativity?  Or  are  they  on  the  contrary
fundamentally nihilistic? This anti-philosophical philosophy often aims to supplant the
formulated—and perhaps formulaic—processes of philosophy conceived as an exclusive
history,  canon,  and institution.  Behind these tendencies,  however,  are a  number of
tropologically  American  values  such  as  self-autonomy,  self-definition,  liberty  and
egalitarianism: a trust in the individual to “make good,” with its roots firmly planted in
a  specific  interpretation  of  Emersonian  self-reliance,  and  the  Puritan  moral
responsibility of the autonomous self.
39 In  choosing  not  to  foreground  the  hidden  processes  of  narrative  artifice,  and  in
nominally seeking to hide or to underplay its own textual machinery, realist texts such
as Ford’s may appear to consider language a more transparent medium, forever hiding
the networks of props and pulleys which lie behind their textual stage. But the specific
vision of philosophy which takes root here is not of socio-political engagement, nor
even of ethical or moral interrogation—all of which find ample sustenance in realist
modes—but of philosophizing as a purely self-reflexive process: one of thinking about
thinking, and reasoning about reasoning, which deprives one of the possibility of ever
accessing a transcendent “experience,” “true life,” or “pure being.” 
40 At  the  end  of  Frank  Bascombe’s  questionings  then  is  the  temptation,  but  ultimate
impossibility, of accepting an ironically Socratic condition of knowing ignorance. This
dilemma is not only supremely pertinent to Bascombe’s state, but also to a particular
moment in American history in which, in spite of social and financial ameliorations, the
foundation of a stable subjective epistemology may seem fundamentally out of reach.
As William Chernecky puts it: “Ford’s Frank Bascombe novels reflect the contemporary
American cultural  climate where people no longer yearn for personal  salvation,  let
alone any return to some earlier epoch, but for the sense, the ephemeral illusion, of
well-being, good health, and psychic security” (Chernecky, 164 2010).
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41 Pure experience, like pure being, cannot exist, for the reason that such categories as
“life” or “experience” are themselves philosophical inventions, and the quest for an
unmediated  state  of  existence  itself  a  mediation. In  this  context,  the  practical
uselessness  not  only  of  philosophy,  but  of  any  reflection  which  may  be  labelled
philosophical,  is  its  perceived  inadequacy  to  prepare  one  to  live.  But  as  Frank
Bascombe’s  case  makes  clear,  the  deep  irony  is  that  all  preparation  for  living  is,
necessarily, itself living, and all thinking about life is, in the end, what we call life itself.
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NOTES
1. Throughout  this  article  I  do  not  use  the  term literary  “realism” to  refer  to  a  restrictive
category, but rather to a range of flexible modes, tropes and techniques, which at once express,
counter,  and  play  with  mythologized  ideals  of  narrative  coherency,  rhetorical  transparency,
extra-diegetic reference and epistemological omniscience. A narrow definition would not only be
impossible  for  more  contemporary  fiction—even  more  so  than  for  nineteenth-century
antecedents—but  would  effectively  exclude  texts  which  strive  to  actively  reshape  realist
traditions for their own aesthetic and ideological ends.
2. It is not possible within the parameters of the present paper to fully develop this literary-
historical  argument  regarding  the  complex  relationship  of  post-war  “realist”  fiction  to  the
supposedly more philosophical texts of a “postmodern” canon, nor to debate the applicability of
these often disputed categories. A far more in-depth treatment is provided however in my new
monograph,  entitled The  Artifice  of  Affect.  American  Realism  and  the  Critique  of  Emotional  Truth
(forthcoming).
3. See Kohn 2011, Bonca 2002, Herren 2015, Mahon and McHugh 2016.
4. See Kant’s devaluation of experience in favor of reason in the Critique of Pure Reason: “Nothing,
indeed, can be more injurious, or more unworthy of a philosopher, than the vulgar appeal to so-
called adverse experience. Such experience would never have existed at all, if at the proper time
those  institutions  had been established in  accordance  with  ideas,  and if  ideas  had not  been
displaced by crude conceptions which, just because they have been derived from experience,
have nullified all good intentions” (Kant, 2007 312). Kant is speaking however of experience as a
possible basis of an epistemology, rather than of experience, as will later be the case with Richard
Ford’s  Frank  Bascombe,  as  an  ontological  state,  nominally  disconnected  from  knowledge  or
epistemological systems. 
5. This valuing of a purely experiential truth is similarly tightly bound up with famously realist
valuations of “ordinary” experience. Regarding Richard Ford, Andrew Bennet identifies this as an
explicitly Romantic heritage, finding its form in “a registering or expressing of the stuff of the
ordinary that does not move beyond the ordinary to make it extraordinary” (Bennett, 2012 176).
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As  Bennett  argues  however:  “the  paradox  of  the  ordinary  is  one  that  engages  with  the
fundamental problematic of literature itself, with the question of exemplarity: as soon as you
write about an ordinary, everyday experience, you make that experience unusual, you mark it,
remark it, make it remarkable, just in marking it” (Bennet, 2012 187).
6. This question recalls Aristotle’s discussion, in Chapter 9 of On Interpretation, of the problem of
future contingents: “It is manifest that […] circumstances are not influenced by the fact of an
affirmation or denial on the part of anyone. For events will not take place or fail to take place
because it was stated that they would or would not take place.” The problem being, however,
“that of which someone has said truly that it will be, cannot fail to take place; and of that which
takes places, it was always true to say that it would be.” If this is true, as Aristotle puts it, it would
be useless “to deliberate or to take trouble, on the supposition that if we should adopt a certain
course, a certain result would follow, while, if we did not, the result would not follow” (Aristotle,
1952 29).
7. Moreover,  this  lexical  choice  is  crucial,  for  “passions”  refers  to  a  specific  historicized
conception of emotional intensities, one emerging out of Hippocratic models of the balance of
passional  humors,  and  particularly  from  Galen’s  sixteenth-century  identification  of  “non-
naturals,”  which included “the  passions  or  perturbations  of  the  soul”  (see  Rather,  1968  and
Jarcho, 1970).
ABSTRACTS
“Explaining is where we all get into trouble,” affirms Richard Ford’s anti-hero Frank Bascombe in
The Sportswriter. Frank spends however a great deal of the novel explaining why explanation must
be  avoided,  and  why  life  must  be  not  interpreted,  but  rather  lived.  This  position  may  be
compared to Nick Shay’s misological efforts, in Don DeLillo’s Underworld, to preserve a “wordless
shock”  before  the  world,  or  the  renouncement  of  the  search  for  meaning  in  Philip  Roth’s
American Pastoral (“He had learned the worst lesson that life can teach—that it makes no sense”). 
Such  explicit  protests  against  self-reflection  may  initially  appear symptomatic  of  an  anti-
intellectual impetus within a society which views philosophy as a threatening limitation of the
free  American  self.  As  challenges  to  a  reductive,  rationalizing  and  explicative  logos,  such
novelistic discourses of resistance against the philosophical are highly self-critical, self-reflexive,
and metatextual. They thus represent a solipsistic philosophy, with a history arguably as long as
philosophy itself, which this article considers in specific reference to the fiction of Richard Ford,
especially  his  1986  novel  The  Sportswriter.  Far  from  proposing  the  United  States  as  an  anti-
philosophical culture, these discourses, as fictional incarnations of an ironic Socratic archetype,
rather explore ways in which modes of reticence against philosophy, construed at once as an
institution,  mode  of  discourse,  and  epistemological  method,  are  themselves  explicitly
philosophical positionings.
« Explaining is where we all get into trouble », affirme Frank Bascombe, l’anti-héros du roman
The Sportswriter de Richard Ford. Et pourtant, Frank ne cesse d’expliquer, au fil de longues pages,
en quoi il faut éviter toute explication et pourquoi la vie doit être vécue plutôt qu’interprétée.
Cette forme d’anti-philosophie peut évoquer les élans misologiques de Nick Shay dans Underworld
de  Don  DeLillo,  qui  veille  à  maintenir  un  état  de  « choc  muet »  devant  le  monde,  ou  le
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renoncement à toute quête de sens dans American Pastoral de Philip Roth (« He had learned the
worst lesson that life can teach—that it makes no sense »). 
Ces  attaques  explicites  à  l’égard  de  la  réflexion  sur  soi peuvent  apparaître,  a  priori,
symptomatiques  d’une  attitude  d’anti-intellectualisme  propre  à  une  société  qui  considère  la
philosophie comme une limitation menaçant le moi américain libre. Cependant, de tels discours
de  résistance  à  l’encontre  du  philosophique,  en  cela  même qu’ils  prétendent  défier  un  logos
réducteur,  rationalisant  et  explicatif,  se  révèlent  hautement  autocritiques,  réflexifs  et
métatextuels. Ils relèvent d’une philosophie solipsiste dont l’histoire est au moins aussi longue
que celle de la philosophie, et que cet article interroge à travers les romans de Richard Ford, plus
particulièrement  The  Sportswriter (1986).  Loin  d’ancrer  les  États-Unis  dans  une  culture  anti-
philosophique,  ces  discours  se  présentent  comme  les  incarnations  fictives  d’un  archétype
socratique ironique. Ils invitent à explorer dans leur pluralité les formes de réticence envers la
philosophie – comme institution, modalité discursive et méthode épistémologique.
INDEX
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